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The Timeliness of Financial Reporting: An
Empirical Legal Study of Russian Banks
Robert W. McGee*, Yeomin Yoon**, and Thomas Tarangelo***
Abstract

The timeliness of financial reporting has been an important topic in the
accounting literature for decades. There is a tradeoff between the timeliness of
reporting and the value of the information being reported. Prior to the advent of
the internet, reporting had to be done using print media. However, now that
many companies post their annual and quarterly reports on the internet, it is
possible to report in a more timely fashion than has previously been possible.
The problem is that companies in some countries do not make full use of this
disclosure tool. They sometimes take many months to make the information
available to the general public. The present empirical legal study examines the
timeliness of financial reporting in the Russian banking sector and compares it
to the SEC benchmark.

* Robert W. McGee is an associate professor at Fayetteville State University in North
Carolina. He has published 58 books and more than 600 articles in several disciplines. His next
book will be a novel, Justifiable Homicide: A Political Thriller.
** Yeomin Yoon is a professor of finance and international business at the Stillman School
of Business, Seton Hall University in New Jersey. His commentaries on global financial
and other issues are often published in major newspapers including Financial Times, Star
Ledger, and Korea Herald. Professor Yoon served as academic advisor/senior special
fellow of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research.
*** Thomas J. Tarangelo is a graduate of the University of Arizona and the Levin College
of Law at the University of Florida. Mr. Tarangelo is an Instructor in Business Law at
Florida International University in Miami, Florida, and he is a member of the Florida Bar
and the Academy of Legal Studies in Business (ALSB).
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I. INTRODUCTION 1

A number of organizations have addressed the issue of timeliness
in financial reporting.
The Accounting Principles Board, the
forerunner of the Financial Accounting Standards Board in the United
States, listed timeliness as one of the qualitative objectives of financial
reporting disclosure. 2 The Governmental Accounting Standards
Board’s Concepts Statement No. 1 points out that financial statements
must be made available in a timely fashion so that decision makers can
make more informed decisions. 3 In order to achieve this result,
Concepts Statement No. 1 requires that entities must make their
financial information available as soon as possible after the end of the
reporting period. 4 Likewise, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
has a similar Statement. 5
The Government Finance Officers Association has made a list of
practical administrative suggestions for issuing more timely financial
reports. 6 Those suggestions include:
1. Recording activity throughout the year rather than waiting
until after the end of the fiscal year; 7
2. Closing the books in a timely manner to minimize delays in
determining the final numbers that will appear in the
annual report; 8

1. An earlier study using the same methodology reached similar conclusions. However, the
earlier study examined fewer banks (73, compared to 79 in the present study) and examined
fewer years (sample size 254, compared to 440 in the present study). The former study included
data only up to 2007, whereas the present study goes up to 2010. Thus, the present study
expands on the earlier study and confirms its findings. See Robert W. McGee & Thomas
Tarangelo, Corporate Governance, the Timeliness of Financial Reporting and the Russian Banking
System: An Empirical Study (Florida International University, Working Paper, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1141885.
2. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS: ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, BASIC
CONCEPTS AND ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES,
STATEMENT NO. 4 (1970). This Statement was critiqued in R.W. Schattke, An Analysis of Accounting
Principles Board Statement No. 4, 47 ACCT. REV. 233 (1972) (initial reactions were mixed).
3. Governmental Accounting Standards Board, Concepts Statement No. 1 of the
Governmental Accounting Standards Board 20 (1987), available at http://www.gasb.org/jsp/
GASB/Page/GASBSectionPage&cid=1176160042391#gasbs25.
4. Id.
5. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 8,
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING: CHAPTER 1, THE OBJECTIVE OF GENERAL PURPOSE
FINANCIAL REPORTING, AND CHAPTER 3, QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF USEFUL FINANCIAL INFORMATION
(A REPLACEMENT OF FASB CONCEPTS STATEMENTS NO. 1 AND NO. 2) 20 (2010), available at.
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176156317989 .
6. See GOV'T FIN. OFFICERS ASS'N., BEST PRACTICE: IMPROVING THE TIMELINESS OF FINANCIAL
REPORTS (2008) (CAAFR), available at http://www.gfoa.org/index.php?option=com_content
&task=view&id=1464.
7. Id. at 1–2.
8. Id. at 2.
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3. Monitor changes in accounting rules and standards and
their implementation dates so that adjustments can be
made well in advance; 9
4. Distribute financial reports electronically;10 and
5. Include a clause in the Request for Proposal for the
independent auditor that states a public release date for
the financial statements. 11
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(henceforth “OECD”) has issued a series of publications that address
various corporate governance issues, including timeliness in reporting.
The publication that has the most general applicability is the OECD’s
12 13
The OECD has also published
Principles of Corporate Governance. ,
guidelines for multinational enterprises, 14 corporate governance
principles for Russia, 15 and for South East Europe. 16
The OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance refers to timeliness
in several places. For example, shareholder rights include the right to
receive relevant and material information on a regular and timely
basis. 17 Shareholders should be informed promptly about the date,
location and agenda of future meetings, as well as full information
about the issues to be discussed. 18 Proxies should be issued on a timely
basis. 19 The corporate governance framework should ensure that all
material matters regarding the corporation should be made on time,
including information relating to its financial situation, performance,
9. See supra note 6, at 2.
10. Id.
11. GOV'T FIN. OFFICERS ASS'N., BEST PRACTICE: IMPROVING THE TIMELINESS OF FINANCIAL
REPORTS 2 (2008) (CAAFR), available at http://www.gfoa.org/index.php?option=com_content
&task=view&id=1464.
12. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/
corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf.
13. Id. at 4. The publication consists of a set of nonbinding standards and benchmark
practices; the publication also offers guidance on how to implement these standards.
14. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ internationa
linvestment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/48004323.pdf.
15. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/corporateaffairs/
corporategovernanceprinciples/2789982.pdf.
16. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ corporate
affairs/corporategovernanceprinciples/20490351.pdf.
17. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 18, 21, 33 & 47 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs
/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 43.
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ownership and governance. 20 All material developments that arise
between regular reporting dates should also be disclosed promptly.21
The channels for the dissemination of information should ensure that
information disseminated in an expeditous, , equal, and cost-effective
basis. 22 The outcome of elections should be disclosed on a timely
basis. 23 Creditors have the right to receive information about corporate
difficulties on a timely basis. 24 Board members need to have access to
relevant, accurate and timely information in order to fulfill their
responsibilities. 25 The supervisory and regulatory authorities also have
an obligation to issue their rulings on a timely and transparent basis. 26
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission also recognizes the
importance of timeliness and requires that listed companies file their
annual 10-K reports by a certain deadline. The filing deadline depends
on a number of factors. For example, large accelerated filers must file
their annual 10-K report within 60 days of year-end and their
quarterly 10-Q report within 40 days of the end of the quarter. 27 Other
accelerated filers must file the annual 10-K report within 75 days of
year-end and the quarterly 10-Q report within 40 days of the end of
the quarter. 28 Other filers have 90 days from year-end to file the annual
10-K report and 45 days from the end of the quarter to file the 10-Q
quarterly report. 29 Foreign private issuers have 90 days from year-end
to file Form 20-F if they are a large accelerated or accelerated filer and
120 days if they are an other filer. 30
One might expect that the SEC’s accelerated deadline rule would
have a positive impact on timeliness, but a study by Bryant-Kutcher,
Peng and Weber 31 found that while firms that are subject to SEC’s
accelerated deadlines experienced improvements in both timeliness
and informativeness, firms that were not affected by the SEC’s
20. See supra note 17, at 22, 49.
21. Id. at 50.
22. Id. at 23, 56.
23. Id. at 54.
24. Id. at 48.
25. Id. at 25, 66.
26. Id. at 30.
27. Revisions to Accelerated Filer Definition and Accelerated Deadlines for Filing Periodic
Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8644, Exchange Act Release No. 52989, 86 SEC Docket 2355
(Dec. 27, 2005).
28. Id.
29. Form 10-K, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (June 26, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm.
30. Foreign Issuer Reporting Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 1310, Exchange Act
Release No. 58620, 94 SEC Docket 403 (Sept. 23, 2008).
31. See Lisa Bryan-Kutcher, Emma Yan Peng, & David P. Weber, Regulating the Timing of
Disclosure: Insights from the Acceleration of 10-K Filing Deadlines (2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160036.
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regulation also had similar improvements. 32 This finding led the
authors to conclude that the improvements might be attributable to
factors other than filing deadlines. 33 They also found that firms forced
to file earlier had a significant increase in restatements, while
companies that filed voluntarily did not, leading to the possible
conclusion that the accelerated reporting rule might have the effect of
decreasing reliability. 34
The issue of timeliness has several facets. There is an inverse
relationship between the quality of financial information and the
timeliness with which it is reported. 35 Accounting information
becomes less relevant with the passage of time. 36
This paper examines the timeliness of financial reporting in the
Russian banking sector and compares it to the SEC benchmark. Part II
presents a review of the literature. Part III discusses the methodology
used for the present study. Part IV presents the findings. Part V
provides some concluding comments.

II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Studies have been done on various aspects of the timeliness of
financial reporting. Some scholars have viewed timeliness as a
subcategory of transparency, along with accuracy, consistency,
appropriateness, completeness, clarity, convenience, governance and
enforcement. 37
Studies comparing the timeliness of disclosure to the kind of news
being reported are mixed. Some studies have found that it takes longer
to report bad news than good news. 38 One logical reason for this delay
is that companies might hesitate to report bad news. A more cynical

32. See supra note 31, at 3.
33. Id. at 22.
34. Id. at 26.
35. W.J. Kenley & G.J. Staubus, Objectives and Concepts of Financial Statements, 49 ACCT. REV.
888, 888-89 (1974).
36. Roland K. Atiase, Linda S. Bamber & Senyo Tse, Timeliness of Financial Reporting, the Firm
Size Effect, and Stock Price Reactions to Annual Earnings Announcements, 5 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES.
526 (1989); see also ELDON S. HENDRIKSEN & MICHAEL F. VAN BREDA, ACCOUNTING THEORY (5th ed.
1992); see also Janice E. Lawrence & Hubert D. Glover, The Effect of Audit Firm Mergers on Audit
Delay, 10 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 151 (1998).
37. See generally Raymond S. Kulzick, Sarbanes-Oxley: Effects on Financial Transparency, 69
SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J. 43 (2004); see also Jeannot Blanchet, Global Standards Offer Opportunity,
FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, March/April, 2002, at 28; see also Ruth Prickett, Sweet Clarity, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT, Sept. 2002, at 18.
38. Rex J. Bates, Discussion of the Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements, 6 J.
ACCT. RES. 93, 93-95 (1968); see also William H. Beaver, The Information Content of Annual
Earnings Announcements, 6 J. ACCT. RES. 67 (1968).
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reason to delay reporting is that some companies take time to massage
the numbers or engage in creative accounting. 39
There is sometimes a tendency to report earnings sooner when
they are better than expected, and later when they are lower than
expected. 40 This pattern was found to exist for Chinese firms 41 and
Greek companies. 42 Some evidence suggests that municipalities report
good news sooner than bad news. 43 However, such was not the case for
Belgian companies. 44 One study found that it takes longer to report
when a company incurs losses or when it reports extraordinary items.45
A Turkish study found that it takes less time to report if a company has
profits rather than losses. 46
One study found that petroleum refining companies actually
delayed reporting good news (extraordinarily high profits) during the
Gulf crisis of the 1990s because of potentially adverse political
repercussions. 47 Another study found that French, German and British
companies reported bad news faster than good news. 48
One reason why companies might report bad news sooner than
good news is because of the ingrained principle of conservatism.49
Companies that have more conservative reporting policies sometimes
take longer to disclose information than companies with more liberal

39. See generally Dan Givoli & Dan Palmon, Timeliness of Annual Earnings Announcements:
Some Empirical Evidence, 57 ACCT. REV. 486 (1982); Mary L. Chai & Samuel Tung, The Effect of
Earnings-Announcement Timing on Earnings Management, 29 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1337 (2002);
Brett Trueman, Theories of Earnings-Announcement Timing, 13 J. ACCT. & ECON. 285 (1990).
40. See generally Anne E. Chambers & Stephen H. Penman, Timeliness of Reporting and the
Stock Price Reaction to Earnings Announcements, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 21 (1984); William Kross &
Douglas A. Schroeder, An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of Quarterly Earnings Announcement
Timing on Stock Returns, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 153 (1984).
41. See generally In-Mu Haw, Daqing Qi & Woody Wu, Timeliness of Annual Report Releases
and Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements in an Emerging Capital Market: The Case of China,
11 J. INT’L FIN. MGMT. & ACCT. 108 (2000).
42. See generally Stergios Leventis & Pauline Weetman, Timeliness of Financial Reporting:
Applicability of Disclosure Theories in an Emerging Capital Market, 34 ACCT. & BUS. RES. 43 (2004).
43. See generally Peggy D. Dwyer & Earl R. Wilson, An Empirical Investigation of Factors
Affecting the Timeliness of Reporting by Municipalities, 8 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 29 (1989).
44. See generally Jan Annaert, Marc J.K. DeCeuster, Ruud Polfliet & Geert Van Campenhaut, To
Be or Not Be . . . “Too Late”: The Case of the Belgian Semi-Annual Earnings Announcements, 29 J.
BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 477 (2002).
45. See generally Robert H. Ashton, Paul R. Graul & James D. Newton, Audit Delay and the
Timeliness of Corporate Reporting, 5 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 657 (1989).
46. See generally Asli Türel, Timeliness of Financial Reporting in Emerging Capital Markets:
Evidence from Turkey, 39 ISTANBUL UNIV. J. SCH. BUS. ADMIN. 238 (2010), available at
http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/29799.
47. See generally Jerry C.Y. Han & Shiing-wu Wang, Political Costs and Earnings Management
of Oil Companies during the 1990 Persian Gulf Crises, 73 ACCT. REV. 103 (1998).
48. See generally Begoña Giner & William P. Rees, On the Asymmetric Recognition of Good and
Bad News in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, 28 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1285 (2001).
49. See generally Sudipta Basu, The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of
Earnings, 24 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (1997).
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reporting policies. 50 However, this tendency may be country-specific.
In the Czech Republic, for example, conservatism seemingly did not
play a role in the timeliness of reporting good or bad news, perhaps
because the Czech tax system does not provide any incentives for
accelerating or delaying financial reporting. 51 One study found that
companies in countries that have a strong shareholder orientation
tend to disclose earnings data sooner than countries that have a civil
code system when it comes to share prices. 52
There might be a relationship between the quickness with which
information is disclosed and the effect the disclosure has on a
company’s stock price. 53 If the market accurately reflects information,
which is the underlying assumption of the efficient market hypothesis,
then one would expect that the longer one takes to report certain
information, the less effect it would have on stock price. 54 Some studies
have found this to be the case. 55
Some studies have compared the timeliness of financial reporting
in different countries. One study found that Belgian companies take
longer to report financial information than do Anglo-Saxon countries.56
This tendency toward slower reporting held true for the disclosure of
interim information as well. 57

50. See generally Frank B. Gigler & Thomas Hemmer, Conservatism, Optimal Disclosure Policy,
and the Timeliness of Financial Reports, 76 ACCT. REV. 471 (2001).
51. See generally Irina Jindrichovska & Stuart McLeay, Accounting for Good News and
Accounting for Bad News: Some Empirical Evidence from the Czech Republic, 14 EUR. ACCT. REV. 635
(2005).
52. See generally Ray Ball, S.P. Kothari & Ashok Robin, The Effect of International Institutional
Factors on Properties of Accounting Earnings, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON. 1 (2000). For another study on
this topic, see Jerry C.Y. Han & John J. Wild, Timeliness of Reporting and Earnings Information
Transfers, 24 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 527 (1997). See also Peter F. Pope & Martin Walker, International
Differences in the Timeliness, Conservatism, and Classification of Earnings, 37 J. ACCT. RES. 53
(1999).
53. See generally Ray Ball & Philip Brown, An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income
Numbers, 6 J. ACCT. RES. 159 (1968); Philip Brown & J.W. Kennelly, The Information Content of
Quarterly Earnings: An Extension and Some Further Evidence, 45 J. BUS. 403 (1972).
54. Id.
55. See Ray Ball & Philip Brown, An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers, 6 J.
ACCT. RES. 159, 176–77 (1968); see also Philip Brown & J.W. Kennelly, The Information Content of
Quarterly Earnings: An Extension and Some Further Evidence, 45 J. BUS. 403, 415 (1972).
56. Marc DeCeuster & Dirk Trappers, Determinants of the Timeliness of Belgian Financial
Statements, (University of Antwerp, Working Paper, 1993), cited in Jan Annaert, Marc J.K.
DeCeuster, Ruud Polfliet & Geert Van Campenhout, To Be or Not Be … “Too Late”: The Case of the
Belgian Semi-annual Earnings Announcements, 29 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 477, 478 (2002).
57. Jan Annaert, Marc J.K. DeCeuster, Ruud Polfliet & Geert Van Campenhout, To Be or Not Be .
. . “Too Late”: The Case of the Belgian Semi-annual Earnings Announcements, 29 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT.
477, 487–89 (2002). For a discussion of reporting financial information on the internet, see Hollis
Ashbaugh, Karla M. Johnstone & Terry D. Warfield, Corporate Reporting on the Internet, 13 ACCT.
HORIZONS 241, 255 (1999). These authors point out that, although using the internet can result in
faster and more widespread dissemination, publishing statements that are two years old does not
improve the timeliness of financial reporting.
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It is difficult to determine, a priori, whether large firms report
financial data faster than small firms. One might think that small firms
report faster, since they have less information to assemble and
organize. On the other hand, large firms might have more resources
available to aid in the reporting process, which would cause them to be
faster when it comes to financial reporting. A study examining this
issue found that large firms report faster than small firms. 58 This study
also found that when earnings are reported, the market reaction is
bigger for small firms than for large firms. 59 A study of Australian firms
found that it takes medium-sized companies longer to report than
either larger or smaller firms, and that profitability was not a
significant variable. 60
One might think that smaller audit firms might have shorter audit
delays than larger audit firms because they have fewer layers of
bureaucracy. On the other hand, one might guess that large audit firms
would have shorter audit delays because of their ability to marshal
more of their forces to complete a job in a timely manner. One study
found that smaller audit firms take longer to issue their audit
opinions. 61
When an independent accounting firm issues a qualified audit
opinion, it is because the company being audited has not complied
with the relevant generally accepted accounting principles. One might
expect that it takes longer to release financial information in cases
where a qualified opinion is about to be issued, since the audit firm and
company have to discuss the reason for the deficiency and determine
what to do about it and how to disclose it to the general public. A
study of Australian companies with qualified audit opinions found this
to be the case, and that the extent of the delay was longer in cases
where the reason for the qualified opinion was serious. 62 Studies of
U.S. 63 and French 64 companies reached the same result. Another study
of Australian firms found that firms in distress took significantly longer
58. Roland K. Atiase, Linda S. Bamber & Senyo Tse, Timeliness of Financial Reporting, the Firm
Size Effect, and Stock Price Reactions to Annual Earnings Announcements, 5 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES.
526, 548 (1989).
59. Id.
60. B. Davies & Greg P. Whittred, The Association between Selected Corporate Attributes and
Timeliness in Corporate Reporting: Further Analysis, 16 ABACUS 48, 59 (1980).
61. Robert H. Ashton, Paul R. Graul & James D. Newton, Audit Delay and the Timeliness of
Corporate Reporting, 5 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 657, 666 (1989).
62. Greg P. Whittred, Audit Qualification and the Timeliness of Corporate Annual Reports, 55
ACCT. REV. 563, 572 (1980).
63. Stuart B. Keller, Reporting Timeliness in the Presence of Subject to Audit Qualifications, 13 J.
BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 117, 122 (1986).
64. Bahram Soltani, Timeliness of Corporate and Audit Reports: Some Empirical Evidence in the
French Context, 37 INT’L J. ACCT. 215, 242 (2002).
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to report financial results. 65 A Turkish study found that companies that
had standard audit opinions took less time to report financial data than
companies that had other kinds of audit opinions. 66
A Canadian study found that the more assets a company had, the
less time it took to issue the audit report. 67 That same study found that
financial services companies and companies that have their year-end
during the busy season also had short delays. 68
One might expect that audit firms with more expertise in the
industry would take less time to issue their audit opinion than audit
firms with less expertise. One study found this relationship to be true
when their clients had bad earnings data to report. 69 A Turkish study
found that it takes Big Four audit firms 70 longer to issue their audit
opinion than smaller audit firms. 71
A number of other variables have been linked with audit delays.
An Egyptian study involving 85 companies listed on the Cairo Stock
Exchange found that audit delay was significantly affected by (1) board
independence, (2) duality of the CEO, (3) the existence of an audit
committee, (4) company size, (5) industry, and (6) profitability. 72
Ownership concentration had no significant impact on audit delay. 73
A Spanish study of audit delay found that companies having the
least delay were in industries that were subject to regulatory pressure
such as the financial and energy sectors. 74 The size of the company
relative to the industry sector also had a significant correlation to the
length of audit delay. 75 Audit firm, regulatory change and qualifications
did not have a significant correlation to audit delay. 76
Some countries have rules regarding the maximum time that may
elapse before financial reports become delinquent. One Turkish study
of nonfinancial companies found that 28 percent of the companies that
65. See Greg Whittred & Ian Zimmer, Timeliness of Financial Reporting and Financial Distress,
59 ACCT. REV. 287, 290 (1984).
66. See Türel, supra note 46.
67. Robert H. Ashton, Paul R. Graul & James D. Newton, Audit Delay and the Timeliness of
Corporate Reporting, 5 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 657, 666 (1989).
68. Id.
69. Gopal V. Krishnan, The Association between Big 6 Auditor Industry Expertise and the
Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings, 20 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 209, 227 (2005).
70. The Big Four accounting firms include PricewaterhouseCooper, Ernst & Young, Deloitte
Touche, and KPMG.
71. See Türel, supra note 46.
72. See H.A.E. Afify, Determinants of Audit Report Lag: Does Implementing Corporate
Governance Have Any Impact? Empirical Evidence from Egypt, 10 J. APPLIED ACCT. RES. 56 (2009).
73. Id.
74. Enrique Bonsón-Ponte, Toms Escobar-Rodríguez & Cinta Borrero-Domínguez, Empirical
Analysis of Delays in the Signing of Audit Reports in Spain, 12 INT’L J. AUDITING 129, 138–39 (2008).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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publish separate statements and 16 percent of the companies that
publish consolidated financial statements exceeded the regulatory
deadline for reporting. 77 A study comparing the timeliness of financial
reporting for U.S. and non-U.S. companies found that U.S. companies
report sooner and U.S firms are less likely to exceed to statutory
maximums. 78
Another Turkish study found that nonfinancial firms take longer
to publish their financial statements, that companies issuing
consolidated statements take longer to report than companies that do
not issue consolidated statements, and companies that have earnings
report sooner than do companies that have losses. 79
A few studies have compared the timeliness of financial reporting
in transition economies to financial reporting in the more developed
market economies. One might expect, a priori, that companies in the
more developed market economies would report sooner, because they
have more resources and because they have been doing it longer, and
are thus farther up the learning curve. Studies of the Russian energy
sector found that Russian companies take significantly longer to report
than do non-Russian companies in the energy sector. 80 A study of the
Russian telecom industry reached the same conclusion. 81
A study of Chinese and non-Chinese companies found that Chinese
companies take significantly longer to report financial results.82
However, a study comparing new EU countries that are also transition
economies to EU countries that are not transition economies found no
difference in timeliness. 83
77. See Türel, supra note 46.
78. See C. Mitchell Conover, Robert E. Miller and Andrew Szakmary, The Timeliness of
Accounting Disclosures in International Security Markets, 17 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 849 (2008)
(presenting a 22-country study over 11 years).
79. See Rabia Aktaş & Mahmut Karğin, Timeliness of Reporting and the Quality of Financial
Information, 63 INT’L RES. J. FIN. & ECON. 71 (2011), available at http://www.eurojournals.com/
IRJFE_63_04.pdf.
80. Robert W. McGee, Timeliness of Financial Reporting in the Energy Sector, 4(2) RUSSIAN/CIS
ENERGY & MINING L.J. 6 (2006); see also Robert W. McGee, Corporate Governance and the Timeliness
of Financial Reporting: A Case Study of the Russian Energy Sector (Andreas School of Business,
Working Paper, 2007).
81. See Robert W. McGee, Corporate Governance in Russia: A Case Study of Timeliness of
Financial Reporting in the Telecom Industry, 7 INT’L FIN. REV. 365 (2007).
82. See Robert W. McGee, & Xiaoli Yuan, Corporate Governance and the Timeliness of Financial
Reporting: An Empirical Study of the People’s Republic of China, 3(1) INT’L J. BUS., ACCT. & FIN. 19
(2009).
83. Robert W. McGee, & Danielle N. Igoe, Corporate Governance and the Timeliness of Financial
Reporting: A Comparative Study of Selected EU and Transition Countries, 43rd Annual Western
Regional Meeting of the American Accounting Association, San Francisco, May 1-3, 2008, 74–87,
reprinted in Robert W. McGee, editor, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES (Robert W.
McGee, Ed., 2008) 189.
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The World Bank has conducted similar studies examining the
issue of timeliness of financial reporting in developing or transition
countries. 84 In these studies, timeliness was classified into the
following five categories, based on how closely the practice of
timeliness came to meeting the OECD benchmark: observed, largely
observed, partially observed, materially not observed, and not
observed. The differences between categories are somewhat arbitrary.
Different teams were hired to conduct studies in different countries.
However, in general it can be said that companies in the countries that
earned the “Observed” label reported results in a timely manner all or
nearly all of the time; those that earned the “Largely Observed” label
were somewhat less diligent in reporting in a timely manner; those
who earned the “Partially Observed” label were timely sometimes;
those labeled as “Materially Not Observed” usually did not report in a
timely manner; and those labeled “Not Observed” generally did not see
the need to report financial results in a timely manner. Table 1 lists
the countries that were classified into each category.

84. Links to these studies may be found at www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg.html.
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Table 1
The Timeliness of Financial Reporting 85
Observed
[0 country]
None

Largely
Observed
[9
countries]
Hungary
India

Partially
Observed
[19
countries]
Armenia
Bhutan

Jordan
Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
Pakistan

Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
Colombia
Czech
Republic
Egypt
Ghana
Indonesia
Latvia
Lithuania
Mauritius
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Romania
Slovenia
South Africa

Poland
Thailand

Materially
Not
Observed
[11
countries]
Azerbaijan
Bosnia &
Herz.
Croatia
Georgia
Macedonia
Nepal
Senegal

Not
Observed
[1 country]
Moldova

Slovakia
Ukraine
Uruguay
Vietnam

As can be seen, none of the countries are operating at the highest
level, although some countries are doing better than others. The most
frequent category, with 19 members, was the partially observed
category. The largely observed and partially observed categories had
about the same number of members; each had about half as many
members as the partially observed category. Moldova was the only
country in the lowest category.
As a general rule, one might conclude that the more developed
countries are doing better than the less developed countries, and
countries that are members of the European Union are doing better
85. Data for the table were gathered from the various World Bank corporate governance
reports, which may be found at www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg.html.

MCGEE_EDITED (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2013

2/1/2013 12:15 AM

FINANCIAL REPORTING

315

than European countries that are not EU members. However, there are
exceptions to this general trend. For example, Croatia and Slovakia are
both EU members, but both are in the next to the lowest category in
terms of timeliness. 86
The World Bank has not done a similar study for Russia, so it is
not possible to classify the extent of Russian compliance with the
timeliness requirement with a great deal of precision. However, if one
were to guess, a reasonable assumption would be that the Russian87
degree of compliance might be similar to the Ukrainian 88 extent of
compliance, since the level of accounting development in the two
countries is similar in many ways. One reason for the present study is
to measure the degree of compliance with the timeliness benchmark
for Russia. The banking industry was chosen for examination because
banking is often the most developed industry as far as financial
reporting is concerned. 89

III. METHODOLOGY

Timeliness was determined by counting the number of days that
elapsed between year-end and the date of the auditor’s report. Some
data was gathered from www.rustocks.com, a website that contains a

86. There are a number of possible explanations for these relationships. Less developed
countries have a less developed capital market than the more developed countries, generally are
not as concerned about the needs of shareholders, and do not have as much internal or external
pressure to report in a timely manner. Countries that are members of the EU require their
corporations to use International Financial Reporting Standards, which includes a timeliness
requirement. Some less developed countries either have not yet adopted IFRS or tend to follow
IFRS less rigorously. Since capital markets in developing countries generally are not as strong or
developed as the capital markets in the more developed countries, equity markets tend to be
weak, which means that companies that want financing tend to go to the debt market, especially
banks, rather than the equity market. Banks are not overly concerned with the information
potential clients give their shareholders, and are able to demand whatever information they think
is needed to make a loan decision. In other words, where there is no demand for timely reporting,
there will be no supply of financial information in a timely manner, at least not to the general
public.
87. See ROBERT W. MCGEE & GALINA G. PREOBRAGENSKAYA, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM
REFORM IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIA (2005).
88. See ROBERT W. MCGEE AND GALINA G. PREOBRAGENSKAYA, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM
REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE AND ASIA (2006).
89. Some recent information is available on corporate governance in Russia, although it does
not address the timeliness of financial reporting. See Igor Belikov, et. al., Russia and the World: A
Comparison of Corporate Governance Practices, Center for International Private Enterprise, (Oct.
31, 2011), http://www.cipe.org/publications/detail/russia-and-world-comparison-corporategovernance-practices. There has been a general improvement in corporate governance practices
in Russian firms in recent years, especially in the case of small and medium size enterprises;
improvement in the transparency of ownership structures has been slow; the quality of corporate
governance in state owned enterprises remains low.
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wealth of information on Russian companies. Other data was gathered
by going directly to the Russian company websites or the Securities
and Exchange Commission website. 90
Such a methodology is less than perfect for several reasons. For
one, the date on the audit report might not be the same as the date the
information was released to the general public. However, there is no
way to obtain the date the information was released to the general
public, so the date on the audit report acted as a surrogate for the
actual release date. A similar methodology was used in a study of
Canadian companies audited by Canadian firms. 91
Secondly, the sample only consisted of annual reports that were in
the English language. However, this skewed sample does not
constitute a fatal flaw, since it is likely that Russian banks that do not
publish their financial statements in the English language are not
seeking foreign investment, 92 so a sample that consists of only English
language annual reports sufficiently captures the banks that are most
likely looking for foreign capital. It is this group that is most likely to
be concerned with the timeliness of financial reporting. Banks that are
not trying to attract foreign capital have little or no pressure to publish
their financial statements in any language, even though Russian law
requires it, since the penalties for noncompliance are slight or none. 93
A third possible criticism of the present study is that some
Russian banks report only one or two years worth of data while others
publish ten or more years of data. Analyzing data where the sample
population differs by year is not as desirable as analyzing data where
the sample sizes by year are about the same. However, the sample
population was small to begin with, so the authors decided that it was
better to enlarge the sample size even if that meant having sample
sizes that differed by year. The alternative would have been to be
forced to work with a much smaller sample size. In the few cases
where banks reported more than ten years of data, the authors
selected only the ten most recent years. Financial reporting practiced
in Russia and other former Soviet republics has changed drastically
90. www.sec.gov.
91. See Robert H. Ashton, Paul R. Graul & James D. Newton, Audit Delay and the Timeliness of
Corporate Reporting, 5 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 657 (1989).
92. This assumption is based on a priori reasoning. If Russian bankers want to raise capital
in foreign markets, they must speak the language of the foreigners who might provide the
financing, and that language is generally English (or at least financial statements that are in
English). Thus, there is little or no need or incentive to publish financial statements in English
unless the goal is to attract foreign capital.
93. This statement is based on one of the author’s consulting experiences in Russia. This
conclusion was reached after interviewing a number of Russian accountants and partners in the
Big Four accounting firms in Moscow.
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since the implosion of the Soviet Union, 94 and it was thought that using
data that was more than ten years old would not provide a fair
reflection of current accounting practices.
Finally, the data found was sometimes incomplete. Some annual
reports disclosed the date of the audit report but not the auditor, or the
auditor but not the date of the audit report. Some annual reports
disclosed the accounting principles used while others did not. In cases
where the company issued consolidated financial statements and also
separate financial statements, the authors chose the date of the audit
report for the consolidated financial statements.
The sample consisted of 440 years of data from 79 Russian banks,
an average of 5.6 years per bank. Table 2 provides some details.

A. OVERALL

IV. FINDINGS

Table 2
Summary Statistical Data
Range
Mean
Median

Days Delay
18-376
112.8
107.0

The average (mean) delay in reporting financial results was 112.8
days; the median was 107.0 days; the range was 18-376 days. One
bank took more than a year to report financial results. Another bank
took nearly a year (346 days). A few extreme delays like these skewed
the distribution somewhat and explain why the median number of
days (107.0) was less than the mean (112.8 days). Three hundred
fifty-two (352) out of 440 (80%) took longer than 75 days to report,
which is the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s deadline for
accelerated filers. If one were to use the SEC 60-day requirement for

94. During the Soviet era, all banks were state owned. There was no need to issue reports to
shareholders, since there were none. The reports that were filed were filed with government
agencies in Moscow (mostly the Finance Ministry), and those reports used Russian Accounting
Standards, which are basically irrelevant outside of Russia and the other former Soviet republics.
Furthermore, Soviet banks did not use IFRS until after the implosion of the Soviet Union. No
Russian language translation of IFRS was available until 1999, which was 8 years after the
implosion. See ROBERT W. MCGEE & GALINA G. PREOBRAGENSKAYA, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM
REFORM IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIA (2005).
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large accelerated filers as the benchmark, 391 of 440 (88.9%) would
have missed the deadline.
From these findings, one might reasonably conclude that financial
reporting in the Russian banking sector is not up to the standard of the
developed market economies, at least in terms of timeliness. If one
begins with the assumption that the sample included in the present
study consists of banks that report in a more timely manner than the
average Russian bank, then one could conclude a priori that the
Russian banking sector, overall, is even farther from meeting the SEC
benchmark than the banks in the present sample. Such an assumption
seems reasonable, given the fact that the present sample consisted
solely of Russian banks that report in English. Russian banks that issue
their financial statements in English have more of an incentive to
report in a timely manner because they are interested in obtaining
capital in the international capital markets, whereas Russian banks
that report only in Russian are not.

B. TREND

While drawing definitive conclusions based on our relatively small
sample size is challenging, there are some general trends that can be
seen by examining the data on an annual basis. Table 3 reports the
results by year.
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Table 3: Data Reported by Year
Year
n
Mean
1998
2
147.5

319

Median
147.5

Range
113-182

1999

4

87.8

67.5

42-174

2000

13

100.0

106.0

45-180

2001

17

83.1

70.0

44-184

2002

31

107.2

94.0

38-232

2003

48

108.3

141.5

29-346

2004

59

111.8

98.0

18-270

2005

60

110.7

107.5

31-181

2006

64

115.4

114.5

21-180

2007

54

125.1

120.0

25-258

2008

40

123.0

116.5

21-376

2009

35

123.9

113.0

21-181

2010

13

85.5

88.0

49-129

While data for all years were reported in the interest of
completeness, some should be ignored. The first two to four years
should be ignored because of the small sample size. The data for 2010
should be ignored because it is incomplete. 95 The authors completed
gathering the data in mid-2011. As of then, only the timeliest of the
Russian banks had reported their data for 2010. The least timely
banks had not yet reported.
If we examine just the 2000-2009 period, the mean score
increased six times and decreased three times; the median increased
four times and declined five times. If we compare the mean score for
2000 and every year thereafter to the mean score for 2009, the mean
score for 2009 was higher than the mean score for the earlier year in

95. The data for 2011 were omitted because some banks likely will not report their 2011
data until the fourth quarter of 2012, if not later. The data for 2012 will not be completely
available until the fourth quarter of 2013 or later.
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eight of nine comparisons. If we compare the median score for 2000
and every year thereafter to the median score for 2009, the median
score for 2009 was higher than the median score for the earlier year in
five of nine comparisons.
From these comparisons we can tentatively conclude that Russian
banks, overall, are becoming less timely over time, which is just the
opposite of what one might assume in the absence of statistical data.
One might think that the financial reporting practices of the Russian
banking sector are becoming more closely aligned with that of the
more developed market economies over time, but that apparently is
not the case. One possible explanation is that Russian companies in
general tend to obtain financing from debt markets rather than equity
markets, and potential creditors, like banks and insurance companies,
are in a position to request whatever information they want in
whatever timeframe they want, and often do so on a confidential basis.
Thus, there is little or no penalty for ignoring the information
requirements of shareholders or publicly disclosing information in a
timely manner, since funding generally does not come from equity
markets. Where there is no demand, there will be no supply.
C. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS USED

Since the Russian banks in this study use different accounting
standards to report their financial results, the authors further
separated and compared the data on the basis of accounting standards
to see if the result might change. 96 The vast majority of Russian banks
used International Accounting Standards or International Financial

96. It might also be mentioned that RAS are substantially different from either U.S. GAAP or
IFRS. Many accounting issues are not addressed in RAS. Both U.S. GAAP and IFRS are far more
comprehensive when it comes to coverage of accounting topics and issues. Also, RAS is more cash
based, whereas both U.S. GAAP and IFRS require the accrual method of accounting. Under accrual
accounting, revenue is recognized when earned, not received, and expenses are recognized when
incurred, not when paid. In a cash system, revenue is recognized when received and expenses are
recognized when paid.
All Russian banks are required by law to use RAS, whereas reporting with other
standards (IFRS or U.S. GAAP) is voluntary, and is done only if the bank wants to attract the
attention of investors who are familiar with some other set of accounting standards.
Russian banks must report using Russian standards within a certain period of time,
although there is little or no penalty for not doing so. The Russian government does not have any
requirements for reporting using other standards, although some foreign stock exchanges do
(NYSE, London, etc.), but these requirements are irrelevant unless the Russian bank in question
lists on a foreign exchange. See ROBERT W. MCGEE & GALINA G. PREOBRAGENSKAYA, ACCOUNTING AND
FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIA (2005).
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Reporting Standards (“IAS/IFRS”) 97 to report their results. However, a
few banks used either U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(“U.S. GAAP”) or Russian Accounting Standards (“RAS”). Table 4
reports the results. Table 5 reports the results of the student t-test
calculations.
Table 4: Accounting Standards Used
Std.

n

Mean

Median

Range

SD

Std.
Error

US GAAP

14

98.5

100.5

51-135

22.8
6

6.11

RAS

47

93.7

100.0

35-118

35.4
6

5.17

IAS/IFRS

366

115.5

107.0

44-376

48.1
3

2.52

N/A

13

Total

440

Table 5: p Values
Accounting Standards Used
US GAAP
RAS

RAS
0.55121
-

IAS/IFRS
0.02041
0.00035

Banks that used RAS had the smallest reporting delay (93.7 days)
but banks that used U.S. GAAP only took a few days longer to report
(98.5 days), which was not significantly different (p = 0.55121).
However, banks that used IAS/IFRS took an average of 115.5 days to
report, which was significantly longer, compared to both U.S. GAAP (p
= 0.02041) and RAS (p = 0.00035).
One possible explanation for the shorter reporting delay when
RAS was used is because Russian banks are required by law to use RAS,
which means they already have the information available but do not
97. A short explanation needs to be made regarding the distinction between International
Accounting Standards (“IAS”) and International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”). Actually,
there is no difference. The International Accounting Standards Committee (“IASC”) was the group
that issued International Accounting Standards (“IAS”). It issued 41 standards. In 2001 it changed
its name to the International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”), at which time it started
issuing International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”). The IAS remain in effect, although
some standards have been repealed or amended. Its official website is www.ifrs.org.
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have to convert RAS to U.S. GAAP or IAS/IFRS. 98 However, that does
not explain why the difference in reporting delay is not significant
when comparing RAS to U.S. GAAP. One possible explanation is that
the sample size for U.S. GAAP is small (n = 14). Another possible
explanation is that the accountants who do the conversion might be
more familiar with U.S. GAAP than IFRS, but this explanation is purely
speculative.
The most obvious explanation to explain why it takes longer to
report when using IAS/IFRS is because the RAS figures must be
converted into IAS/IFRS, which takes time, but that does not explain
why conversion to U.S. GAAP is faster. Although there are differences
between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, the differences are generally slight, and
even in cases where the difference is more than slight, the conversion
from RAS to either U.S. GAAP or IFRS can generally be expected to take
about the same amount of time. One might expect that conversion to
U.S. GAAP might actually take longer, since U.S. GAAP has more rules
and GAAP rules are often more complex than the IFRS version of a
similar standard, but such was not the case.
D. AUDIT FIRM

Since the Russian banks in this study use different audit firms to
conduct their audits, the authors further compared the data based on
the different audit firm banks used. Most of the Russian banks in the
sample used one of the Big Four firms but some used Russian firms or
another international firm. Table 6 reports the data. Table 7 reports
the p values.

Table 6: Audit Firm
Firm
n

Mean

Median

Range

SD

Std.
Error

DT

107

120.0

117.0

35-376

47.52

4.59

EY

62

101.0

94.5

46-213

38.28

4.86

98. All Russian banks must report to the Russian government using RAS. They may also use
other accounting standards, but are not required to under Russian law. The Russian banks
included in the present study all reported using RAS, but generally did not publish their RAS
financial statements in English. Those who did publish them in English were included in the
present study.
The incentive to report in a timely manner could be less when using US GAAP or IFRS in
cases where the Russian bank stock is not listed on a foreign stock exchange, but could be more
when its stock is listed on a foreign exchange.
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KPMG

102

115.1

105.0

44-346

50.31

4.98

PWC

116

117.6

110.0

46-269

38.71

3.59

31

109.5

101.0

29-270

54.77

9.84

BDO

5

110.4

90.0

86-171

36.36

16.26

GT

6

22.8

21.0

18-31

4.58

1.87

N/A

11

Total

440

R

BDO

GT

R

Table 7: p Values
Audit Firm
EY
DT
EY
KPM
G
PWC
R
BDO

0.005
27

KPMG

PWC

0.477
15

0.683
12

0.341
63

0.597
96

2.09734

0.044
34

0.007
08

0.442
58

0.605
39

1.48422

0.691
46

0.613
23

0.792
66

4.95231

0.446
65

0.687
13

1.43334

0.964
15

6.89910
0.005
47

PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PWC”) conducted the most audits
(116), followed by Deloitte & Touche (107), KPMG (102) and Ernst &
Young (62). All Russian firms combined conducted only 31 audits,
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followed by Grant Thornton (6) and BDO (5). In eleven cases, the audit
firm could not be determined.
The banks audited by Grant Thornton were by far the timeliest,
with an average reporting delay of only 22.8 days. Their delays were
significantly less than those for the banks audited by the other firms.
However, it should be pointed out that, with a sample size of 6, the
conclusion is not as strong as it would be if the sample size were larger.
In terms of the speed with which audit reports are issued, the
following generalizations emerge:
• Grant Thornton issues their audit opinions significantly
faster than any other audit firm;
• Ernst & Young issues their audit opinions significantly
fastest of the Big Four firms;
• Three of the Big Four firms other than Ernst & Young, the
Russian audit firms, and BDO all take about the same
amount of time to issue their audit opinions.

One possible explanation for why Ernst & Young takes less time to
issue its opinions is because Ernst & Young has an international
reputation for specializing in banks. However, the other three firms in
the Big Four would likely dispute the claim that Ernst & Young is more
of a specialist than the other firms, and the present study shows that
Ernst & Young conducted fewer audits of Russian banks than any of the
other Big Four firms. Thus, the reason for the faster time is unclear.

V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

This study found that the Russian banking industry does not
report financial results on a timely basis, as a general rule, and that
recent financial history seemingly indicates that the situation is getting
worse rather than better. 99 The study also found that some factors
might have an influence on the timeliness of financial reporting. Banks
that report their results using IFRS take significantly longer to publish
their reports than do banks that use either U.S. GAAP or Russian
Accounting Standards. For some reason, banks that retained Grant

99. An earlier study using the same methodology reached similar conclusions. However, the
earlier study examined fewer banks (73, compared to 79 in the present study) and examined
fewer years (sample size 254, compared to 440 in the present study). The former study included
data only up to 2007, whereas the present study goes up to 2010. Thus, the present study
expands on the earlier study and confirms its findings. See Robert W. McGee and Thomas
Tarangelo, Corporate Governance, the Timeliness of Financial Reporting and the Russian Banking
System: An Empirical Study (Florida International University, Working Paper, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1141885.
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Thornton were significantly faster in reporting results than were
banks that retained one of the Big Four accounting firms or a Russian
firm, and those who employed Ernst & Young reported results
significantly sooner than banks that retained the services of another
Big Four firm.
The results of this study raise several questions for future
research. Could these results be duplicated in studies of other Russian
industries? Could they be duplicated in studies of the banking sector
or other sectors in other Central and East European countries and
former Soviet republics?
Why were Grant Thornton clients able to report significantly
faster than the clients of other audit firms? Was this result a fluke,
which might be the case, given the small sample size, or are there some
underlying factors that need to be examined? Why were the banks that
hired Ernst & Young able to report significantly faster than the banks
that retained the services of other Big Four firms? Could this result be
duplicated in studies of banks in other countries? Does Ernst & Young
report the results of bank audits faster in other countries as well?
Does Earnst & Young report results faster for other sectors of the
Russian economy?
Why is the trend toward less timeliness rather than more? Are
there similar trends in the banking sectors of other transition
economies, and if so, why? Are there similar trends in other sectors of
the Russian or other transition economies?
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